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Abstract 
This paper investigates the profitability determinants of deposit–taking institutions in Fiji, a 
representative South Pacific economy, over the 2000–2010 period.  The study uses panel data 
techniques of fixed effects estimation and generalized method of moments (GMM) to purge 
time–invariant unobserved firm–specific effects and to mitigate potential endogeneity 
problems.  Market power  (measured by the Lerner Index) is a key determinant of 
profitability, which, inter alia, allows institutions to pass on to their clients the interest costs 
of raising deposit liabilities and the overall cost of operations; the association of both with 
profitability is positive and highly significant.  Moreover, raising deposit  liabilities  and 
granting  loan beyond a certain point may not be profitable for institutions.  Policy 
implications  are considerable, especially for the small, fragile, growth–challenged South 
Pacific island economies. 
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Introduction 
Numerous single and cross–country studies show inconclusive results regarding the 
determinants  of banks profitability, suggesting that policies of one country may not be 
suitable for another.  To our knowledge there is no bank profitability study of the foregoing 
nature covering the small, relatively underdeveloped financial systems of the island states in 
the South Pacific.  This study fills that gap.  While data limitations restrict our analysis to 
Fiji,  the financial structure, socio–economic, political and demographic cross–country 
similarities suggest that findings may apply to the rest of the region.  As outlined below, this 
study is important and interesting for a number of other reasons. 
The traditional deposit mobilisation and intermediated credit remain the major and sometimes 
the only viable investment and external financing option across the South Pacific; capital 
markets are either virtually absent or extremely small, including in Fiji.  The demographic
1 
and socio–economic conditions too are unfavourable.  Small size, insularity, remoteness and 
proneness to natural disasters, among other things, render these economies highly vulnerable 
to external forces, threatening sometimes their very economic viability (e.g. Streeten, 1993; 
Briguglio, 1995; Briguglio et al., 2006; ADB, 2004; UNEP, 2004).  Economic growth has not 
only been a constant challenge, prospects are equally disappointing
2.  Consequently, these 
economies remain underdeveloped, fragile, burdened with high levels of poverty, 
unemployment, and experience other socio–economic problems.   
Yet, banks across the South Pacific remain highly profitable; returns on assets commonly 
exceed international averages
3.  Non–bank deposit institutions too are highly profitable; in 
fact, non–banks appear to be more profitable than banks.  In the case of Fiji, for instance, a 
back of the envelop analysis shows that the returns on assets of both banks and non–banks 
have remained high  even in periods of major external shocks including the 2007 global 
financial crisis and the coup d'états of 2000 and 2006.   
                                                           
1 Population size is usually less than a million 
2 Asian Development Outlook for Fiji 2011, http://www.adb.org/documents/books/ado/2011/ado2011-fij.pdf [Accessed: 
August, 2011]. 
3 http://www.pftac.org/Handbooks/Governors%20Paper.pdf 3 
 
While profitability may be important for the stability of financial systems, especially in light 
of the continuing global crisis, high profitability may, at the same time, have adverse 
consequences for the wider economy, including implications for growth of savings and 
investment, and even pricing out of certain users from the financial system.  The functions of 
financial institutions positively and strongly foster a country’s economic growth and 
development
4, however, activities and practices of institutions that, intentionally or 
unintentionally, lead to involuntary exclusion of  any form are likely to have the reverse 
effect, i.e. retard economic growth and potentially increase poverty and inequality (Beck et. 
al., 2007). 
In view of the foregoing, if, on one hand, financial institutions in the South Pacific remain 
highly profitable, and on the other, the economies they operate in continue to struggle with 
poverty, growth and development, then an understanding of the determinants of profitability 
of these institutions might be useful in formulating policies aimed at enhancing growth and 
development via the financial sector.  Profitability of institutions may be influenced by a 
number of factors,  including the level of capital  relative to total assets, the volume and 
growth of deposits and loans, operational efficiency, and market power.  Take capital for 
instance.  In the case of Fiji, both banks and non–banks appear to be well capitalised; in fact, 
in the 2000–2010 period, the capital adequacy ratios of both institution types appear to be 
constantly and distinctly above the minimum required levels
5.  If it is the case that capital 
levels positively and strongly influence profitability then, a number of policy implications 
emerge.  Higher levels of capital may indicate better soundness—from a financial stability 
perspective then, incentives to change this relationship may be restricted.  However, given 
that in the South Pacific assets are financed largely by domestic deposits and capital, higher 
levels of capital financing of assets might indicate lower deposit financing, suggesting, 
among others, that some deposits may not be reaching financial institutions or are kept away.  
In the case of the later, as noted above, growth and development implications can be 
considerable.   
                                                           
4 For comprehensive literature summaries on the finance–growth nexus, see Levine, 1997, 2005; and Beck et al., 2009. 
5 http://www.reservebank.gov.fj/docs2/1%20Quarterly%20Review%20(March%202011).pdf 4 
 
This study is also different from most other studies in that it investigates the profitability 
determinants of both bank and non–bank deposit institutions; most other studies focus only 
on banks.  We are able to do this since, as further explained in section 3, the main activities 
and business models of both institution types are very similar and confined to the domestic 
market; regulatory requirements too are similar, suggesting that the profitability determinants 
might be common.  A combined regression analysis also gives us a more reasonable data size 
for panel analysis; separately they may not be sufficient.  Moreover,  from a policy 
perspective, it might be useful to see if common strategies could be applied to all types of 
deposit institutions.   
The rest of the paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 briefly reviews the literature; section 
3 discusses the data, variables and methodology; section 4 presents and discusses the results; 
and section 5 concludes with some policy implications. 
1.0  Literature review 
In studies on determinants of bank profitability, dependent variables typically are return on 
assets (ROA) and/or return on equity (ROE).  Independent variables have included capital, 
operational efficiency, risk, size, ownership, and market power (e.g. Staikouras and Wood, 
2004; Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Garcia–Herrero et al., 2009); the impact of the recent global 
financial crisis has now also been analysed (Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011).  Interestingly, 
as the following discussion shows, with respect to a number of these determinants, findings 
remain inconclusive, having important implications for policy development and action across 
countries and regions of the world. 
Take size, for instance, introduced in the framework to account for existing economies or 
diseconomies of scale in the market.  Smirlock (1985) and Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007) 
show that size may positively and significantly influence profitability, explained perhaps by 
the potentially higher degree of product and loan diversification of larger banks compared to 
smaller, together with benefits emanating from economies of scale.  Berger et al. (1987), on 
the other hand, show that size may only slightly reduce costs and that very large banks may 
actually suffer from scale inefficiencies  and  Micco et al. (2007) find a positive but 
insignificant relationship between size and profitability.  Athanasoglou et al., 2008 find that 
size is not important for revenue generation. 5 
 
Similarly, credit and liquidity risks are shown to inconsistently influence bank profitability.  
Risk management is inherently associated with bank management; poor asset quality and low 
liquidity levels have been shown to be among the major causes of bank failure.  During 
periods of increased uncertainty, portfolio diversification and/or liquid holdings are 
commonly enhanced.  Abreu and Mendes (2002) find that credit risk, measured by loans to 
assets ratio, positively influenced the profitability of banks in Portugal, Spain, France and 
Germany.  On the other hand, Bourke (1989) and Molyneux and Thornton (1992), among 
others, find a negative and significant relationship between the two.  Possibly, banks exposed 
to riskier loans have also accumulated higher volumes of unpaid loans, which might 
adversely affect profits (Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011).  Similarly, holding higher levels of 
liquid assets may reduce profitability (Bourke, 1989; Molyneux and Thornton, 1992) 
Conflicting results are also found in the case of ownership.  While some studies find state 
ownership to be negatively related with profitability (e.g. Micco et. al., 2007; Iannotta et al., 
2007), others show that ownership—state or private—may have no relevance for bank 
profitability (Bourke, 1989; Molyneux and Thornton, 1992), that empirical evidence may not 
support the theory that privately owned banks perform better than state–owned.  Contrary 
also to popular belief, age may not positively influence profitability; Beck et al. (2005) find 
that in the case of Nigeria, for instance, older banks did not perform as well as the newer 
ones, which were better able to pursue new profit opportunities. 
Similarly, regarding market power, studies by Bourke (1989) and Molyneux and Thornton 
(1992) confirm the structure–conduct–performance (market power) hypothesis that increased 
market power yields monopoly profits; the relationship is positive and significant.  However, 
results of some other studies (Berger, 1995; Demirguc–Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Staikouras 
and Wood, 2004; Athanasoglou et al., 2008) contradict the theory; the relationship may be 
neither positive nor significant.  With respect to equity, empirical evidence suggests that 
better capitalised banks are more likely to be more profitable (e.g. Bourke, 1989; Demirguc–
Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Abreu and Mendes, 2002; Naceur and Goaied, 2001, 2008; 
Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007; and Garcia–Herrero et al., 2009).  However, this may not 
necessarily be the case in all situations; Heffernan and Fu (2010), for instance, find that in the 
case of Chinese banks, the relationship may be positive or negative.  The level of operational 
efficiency, measured by the cost to income ratio (Goddard et al., 2009, Dietrich and 6 
 
Wanzenried, 2011) or overhead costs to total assets (Athanasoglou et al., 2008) is more likely 
to positively influence profitability; these studies and others (e.g. Bourke, 1989; Molyneux 
and Thorton, 1992) show that more efficient institutions  are more likely to  be more 
profitable.   
2.0  Data, Variables and Methodology 
For all practical reasons, Fiji’s financial system is intermediary based (Sharma and Nguyen, 
2011; Sharma and Roca, 2012).  The intermediaries fall into two groups: deposit–taking and 
others.  Only deposit–taking institutions are licensed and supervised by the Reserve Bank of 
Fiji (RBF) and are of two types: banks (may accept demand deposits) and credit institutions 
(may not accept demand deposits).  Otherwise, the main activities and business models of 
both the credit institutions and banks are very similar, and confined to the domestic market; 
regulatory requirements too are very similar, suggesting that the profitability determinants 
might be similar for both institution types.  The non–deposit institutions together, excluding 
the superannuation fund, make up a very tiny proportion of the financial system.  The 
superannuation fund, albeit substantial by asset size, is not really a competitor for the 
deposit–taking institutions with respect to both deposit and lending activities.  
In 2011, there were five banks and 3 credit institutions (hereafter, non–banks, in consonance 
with the wider use of the term) operating in Fiji and all have been included in this study.  The 
banks include: Australia and New Zealand Banking Corporation Ltd (ANZ); Bank of Baroda 
(BOB); Bank of South Pacific Limited (BSP); Colonial National Bank Limited (CNB); and 
Westpac Banking Corporation Limited (WBC).  The non–banks include Credit Corporation 
Fiji Limited (CCFL); Merchant Finance Limited (MF); and Home Finance Company Limited 
(HFC).  These institutions account for 100% of all deposits in the country and, excluding the 
superannuation fund, around 95% of the total loans of all lending institutions in Fiji.  
Relevant and complete data for these institutions are available for the year 2000–2010 from 
Reserve Bank of Fiji
6.   
We have used both return on total assets (ROA) and return on total equity (ROE) as measures 
of profitability, i.e. dependent variables in the regression analysis.  In principle, ROA reflects 
management’s ability to generate revenues from assets; while this ratio may be biased due to 
                                                           
6 http://www.reservebank.gov.fj/default.aspx?page=publishedDS 7 
 
off–balance–sheet activities, such activities in the case of Fiji, is minimal.  ROE is the return 
to shareholders and is the product of ROA and financial leverage of equity multiplier (assets–
to–equity ratio).  Institutions with higher equity (and thus lower leverage) will usually report 
higher ROA but, expectedly, lower ROE.  Thus, the analysis of ROE often disregards risks 
associated with high leverage; moreover, financial leverage is often determined by regulation.  
Accordingly, ROA may be a better measure of profitability.  Nevertheless, we use both. 
The independent variables include: capital (CAP); total deposits (DEP); deposit growth rate 
(DG); total loans (LON); loan growth rate (LG); credit risk (CR); liquid assets (LQA); bank 
size (SZ); non–interest income (NII); funding cost (FC); operational efficiency (OE); and 
Lerner Index (LI; measure of market power).  Table 1 lists the variables used in this study.  
The independent variables are defined below. 
Table 1: Definitions, notations and expected effect of independent variables on profitability 
Variable  Notation  Measure  Expected sign 
Dependent       
Return on assets  ROA  Net profit before taxes/total assets   
Return on equity  ROE  Net profit before taxes/total equity   
Independent       
Capital   CAP  Total equity/total assets  +/– 
Total deposits   DEP  Total deposits/total assets  +/– 
Deposit growth   DG  Annual percentage growth in deposits  +/– 
Total loans   LON  Total loans/total assets  +/– 
Loan growth   LG  Annual percentage growth in loans  +/– 
Credit risk   CR  General reserves for credit losses/gross loans  +/– 
Liquid assets   LQA  Total liquid assets/total assets  – 
Non–interest income   NII  Non–interest income/gross income  + 
Funding cost   FC  Interest expense/total deposits  +/– 
Operational efficiency   OE  Operating costs/gross income  +/– 
Lerner Index   LI  Difference of revenues and expenses/revenues  + 
Size   SZ  Total assets of an institution/total assets of 
industry 
+/– 
Institution type  INSD  Bank = 0; non–bank = 1  + 
 
Capital (CAP) is the ratio of total equity relative to total assets.  Generally, institutions with 
higher capital ratios are considered safer and less risky compared to those with lower ratios.  
However,  according to  the conventional risk–return theory, these institutions  are  also 
expected to have lower returns—institutions with substantial capital funding may be over–
cautious, foregoing profitable investment opportunities; accordingly, a negative relationship 
is expected.  On the other hand, better capitalised banks are more likely to remain more 
profitable during economically difficult times.  Further, better capital position is likely to 8 
 
increase a bank’s creditworthiness and thus reduce its funding costs.  Moreover, well 
capitalised banks may require relatively less external funding, including deposits.  From this 
point of view, better  capitalised banks are expected to be more profitable; a positive 
relationship might emerge.  Thus, the sign could be negative or positive. 
Total deposits (DEP) is defined as the ratio of total deposits to total assets.  Since deposit 
funding is  associated with branching, ATM and other costs, banks that rely largely on 
deposits are likely to be less profitable; a negative sign is expected.  However, in the case of 
Fiji, with extremely small and underdeveloped financial markets, external funding sources 
are primarily deposits, and expectedly cheap due to limited investment options for savers, 
among others.  Accordingly, higher ratios are likely to positively influence profitability.   
Thus, the sign cannot be anticipated.  Total loans (LON) is defined as the ratio of total loans 
to total assets.  Since the main revenue–generating assets of banks in Fiji are loans and 
advances, higher volumes are expected to generate more profits; a positive sign is expected.  
However, substantially high ratios might have adverse implications for liquidity and risk of 
default; the sign therefore can be positive or negative.   
We also include the annual growth in loans (LG) and annual growth in deposits (DG) as 
independent variables.  Generally, if a relatively fast growing institution is able to convert its 
deposit liabilities into income generating assets, particularly loans, profits are expected to 
increase.  However, if doing so exposes a bank to higher credit risk and/or growth is realised 
via lower margins, profitability may be reversed.  Moreover, high growth rates are likely to 
be gradually competed away.  Thus, the signs may be positive or negative. 
Credit risk (CR) is defined as general reserves for credit losses to gross loans.  The ratio 
measures the ability of bank managers to monitor the potential variation in net income 
resulting from non–payment or delayed payment on credit.  Thus, income may decline when 
loans are not collected at all and/or in time.  However, in times of steady good profits, 
provisions for loans may be reduced as stability of cash inflows allow managers to better 
handle sudden defaults.  Higher provisioning may indicate both a higher likelihood of 
possible future losses as well as a timely recognition of weak loans by prudent institutions.  
The sign may be positive or negative.   9 
 
Liquid assets (LQA) is defined as the ratio of total liquid assets (the sum of cash holdings, 
balances at central and other banks, market securities etc.) to total assets.  In the case of Fiji, 
and the rest of the South Pacific, capital markets are underdeveloped and very small, if any, 
and corporate bonds are non–existent.  Yet, for many reasons, including liquidity 
management and perhaps lack of bankable projects, banks invest in state or state–owned 
enterprise securities.  In the case of at least one institution, LQA has constantly been around 
60%, occasionally as high as 68%; for other banks, the ratio has varied between 20 to 40%.  
Since these assets generate no (cash holdings) or little revenue (yield on securities are 
substantially lower than those on loans), higher ratios are expected to reduce profitability 
levels; a negative sign is expected.   
Non–interest income  (NII) is the ratio of NII relative to gross income.  In debates and 
conversations relating to bank profitability in the South Pacific, the attention has mainly been 
on interest rates; data on lending and deposit rates are also more readily available.  Thus, the 
focus has mainly been on interest income; little attention is paid to revenues generated from 
non–interest sources including, fee and commission income and trading operations.   
Moreover, while the financial system in Fiji may be small and underdeveloped, user pay 
practices, relating to deposits, for instance, are common.  In light of this, one might expect 
NII to prominently influence profitability; a positive sign is expected. 
Funding cost  (FC) is defined as the ratio of interest expenses relative to total deposits.   
Operational efficiency (OE) is the operating cost to gross income ratio i.e. the operating costs 
necessary to generate one unit of gross income.  In both cases, the relationships are expected 
to be negative, since high costs are likely to erode profits.  However, to the extent that an 
institution’s ability to pass on costs to their clients is a function of market power, the sign 
may be positive in highly uncompetitive markets, such as Fiji’s.  Thus, in the case of both FC 
and OE, the sign may be negative or positive.  
The Lerner index (LI) is used as a direct measure of the level of competition in the system, 
i.e. market power of banks.  LI is defined as the ratio of the difference between price and 
average cost divided by price, equivalent to the difference between total revenue and total 
cost divided by total revenue (Hawtrey and Liang, 2008).  The values of the index range from 
0 (perfect competition) to 1 (monopoly); the expected sign is positive.  Size (SZ) is the ratio 10 
 
of total assets of an institution relative to the total assets of the industry.  Since larger banks 
may have better capacity to offer a wider range of products and diversify their loans portfolio, 
size may positively influence profitability via risk reduction, enhanced operational efficiency 
and economies of scale effects.  However, agency costs and higher overheads may make 
extremely large banks less profitable; thus, the sign may be positive or negative. 
To empirically estimate the influence of the foregoing determinants on bank profitability, the 
following linear model is estimated: 
      j 
PROFit = βo + ∑ β1X
j
it+εit 
              
j=1 
 
PROFit is profitability (measured as rate of return on assets and rate of return on equity) of 
bank i at time t, where i = 1… N, t = 1… T, βo is a constant, X
j
it are the bank specific 
explanatory variables as explained in the previous section and εit is the disturbance term.  The 
above estimation equation may give rise to problems of endogeneity (causality may run in 
both  directions for some variables)  and  time invariant unobserved firm specific  effects, 
among others.  The problems may be amplified with a relatively short time span, as in our 
case (t = 10).  Thus, Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), proposed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991) and extended by Blundell and Bond (1998), is employed here to control for 
endogeneity. GMM is among the class of instrumental variables (IV) approach which utilises 
the predetermined and endogenous variables in first differences as instruments with 
appropriate lags of the specified variables in levels and strictly exogenous regressors are first-
differenced to be used as instruments in the first–differenced equation.  Since the lagged 
levels are often poor instruments for first differences, the efficiency of this instrumental 
approach may be relatively weak.  Therefore, Blundell and Bond (1998) propose the System–
GMM approach, in which the first–differenced estimator is combined with the estimator in 
levels to form a more efficient estimator.   Nonetheless, for robustness, we estimate the 
equation using three different techniques: Panel Least Squares (PLS) with AR (1) errors, 
Fixed Effects Model (FEM) and GMM with AR(1) and AR(2) errors to examine the second–
order serial correlation in the residuals.  
3.0  Empirical results 11 
 
Although we present results using  the  three different techniques  mentioned above,  in 
discussing policy implications, we focus on the GMM results.  The results from the Arellano-
Bond test for AR(2) indicate that there is no second–order serial correlation in the estimated 
residuals.  We use two sets of data for regression analysis—one with all variables described 
above and another, excluding deposit growth (DG) and loan growth (LG).  The reason for 
excluding DG and LG is to check their co–linearity effects with deposit (DEP) and loan 
(LON) variables.  Table  2  presents  the results with all variables,  table  3  shows results 
excluding DG and LG; in both cases, we have six regressions: two profitability measures 
(ROA and ROE) vis-à-vis three different methods.  Results are discussed below. 
Table 2: Regression results, all variables 
Intercept  PLS  PLS  FEM  FEM  GMM  GMM 
  ROA  ROE  ROA  ROE  ROA  ROE 
C  -0.0091  -0.0911  0.1193**  1.0964*  -0.0702**  -0.1286 
  (0.0178)  (0.1476)  (0.0480)  (0.5858)  (0.0345)  (0.1931) 
CAP  0.1912**  -0.2882  0.0938  -0.1809  0.0967**  -0.7718* 
  (0.0385)  (0.4471)  (0.0691)  0.5385)  (0.0443)  (0.4042) 
DEP  0.0410**  0.2340  -0.0155  0.0208  0.0771***  0.4844 
  (0.0196)  (0.1873)  (0.0226)  (0.2219)  (0.0284)  (0.3091) 
DG  -0.0090***  -0.0997**  -0.0014  -0.0637  -0.0137***  -0.1259*** 
  (0.0030)  (0.0490)  (0.0068)  (0.0608)  (0.0043)  (0.0377) 
LON  -0.0393  -0.2593  -0.0922***  -0.9784**  -0.0114  -0.2942 
  (0.0270)  (0.1678)  (0.0314)  (0.4069)  (0.0321)  (0.2564) 
LG  -0.0018  0.0102  -0.0103**  -0.0361  -0.0016  0.0010 
  (0.0026)  (0.0157)  (0.0046)  (0.0534)  (0.0045)  (0.0262) 
SZ  0.0024  0.3339  -0.1201**  -0.6437  -0.0206  -0.2584 
  (0.0151)  (0.2571)  (0.0463)  (0.4716)  (0.0609)  (0.4576) 
CR  -0.0112  -0.4850  -0.0543  -0.9824  0.0921***  0.4444 
  (0.0579)  (0.3597)  (0.0530)  0.5937  (0.0344)  (0.3966) 
OE  0.0455***  0.5516***  0.0670***  0.5981**  0.0280**  0.3718** 
  (0.0115)  (0.1537)  (0.0235)  (0.2401)  (0.0137)  (0.1504) 
FC  0.0157  0.2068  -0.0217  0.4559  0.0266  0.3940 
  (0.0381)  (0.3965)  (0.0672)  (0.6343)  (0.1049)  (1.3473) 
LI  0.0529***  0.6147***  0.0755***  0.6526***  0.0340***  0.4052*** 
  (0.0119)  (0.1620)  (0.0241)  (0.2452)  (0.0099)  (0.1463) 
LQA  -0.0609*  -0.1818  -0.1185***  -1.0446  -0.0445  -0.4814 
  (0.0290)  (0.2296)  (0.0441)  (0.6550)  (0.0488)  (0.3649) 
NII  -0.0189  -0.4175  -0.0552  -0.6167  0.0601  0.4547 
  (0.0173)  (0.2273)  (0.0340)  (0.3874)  (0.0645)  (0.5115) 
INSD  0.0024*  0.0213  -  -  0.0428*  0.3040 
  (0.0115)  (0.1570)  -  -  (0.0214)  (0.1836) 
AR(1)  0.6789***  0.3865***      0.8161***  0.6499*** 
  (0.0222)  (0.1421)      (0.1665)  (0.1576) 
AR(2)          -0.0899  0.0207 
          (0.1339)  (0.0933) 
Adjusted R
2  0.9049  0.6732  0.8682  0.6567  0.8956  0.7393 
SE  0.0059  0.0729  0.0070  0.0821  0.0062  0.0604 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. SE is standard error.  
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Table 3: Regression results, excluding variables LG, DG 
Intercept  PLS  PLS  FEM  FEM  GMM  GMM 
  ROA  ROE  ROA  ROE  ROA  ROE 
C  0.0006  -0.1744  0.1289  1.1892  -0.0851  -0.3221 
  (0.0198)  (0.2152)  (0.571)  (0.6436)  (0.0511)  (0.4067) 
CAP  0.0684  -0.3401  0.1028  -0.2698  -0.0139  -1.6329** 
  (0.0418)  (0.4663)  (0.0653)  (0.4663)  (0.0507)  (0.6267) 
CR  0.0325  -0.3716  -0.0002  -0.6602  0.1638***  0.8967 
  (0.0531)  (0.4632)  (0.0552)  (0.4580)  (0.0599)  (0.8066) 
DEP  0.0249  0.1717  -0.0107  -0.0804  0.0330  0.2894 
  (0.0201)  (0.1603)  (0.0176)  (0.1643)  (0.0197)  (0.1845) 
FC  0.0989  0.8212  0.0169  0.6497  0.1507**  2.7896*** 
  (0.0613)  (0.5829)  (0.0796)  (0.8194)  (0.0637)  (0.7495) 
LI  0.0612***  0.7282***  0.0663***  0.6106***  0.0582***  0.8141*** 
  (0.0143)  (0.1624)  (0.0220)  (0.2063)  (0.0218)  (0.2039) 
LON  -0.0382  -0.1860  -0.1014**  -0.9418*  0.0504  -0.1079 
  (0.0286)  (0.1726)  (0.0384)  (0.4729)  (0.0533)  (0.4377) 
LQA  -0.0603*  -0.1476  -0.1065*  -0.9340  0.0115  -0.4098 
  (0.0308)  (0.2148)  (0.0551)  (0.6673)  (0.0498)  (0.4652) 
NII  -0.0291**  -0.5020*  -0.0888***  -0.7659**  0.0249  0.4317 
  (0.0139)  (0.2754)  (0.0329)  (0.3413)  (0.0463)  (0.4952) 
OE  0.0543***  0.6662***  0.0560***  0.5517***  0.0516**  0.7946*** 
  (0.0138)  (0.2788)  (0.0208)  (0.1951)  (0.0222)  (0.2136) 
INSD  0.0174**  -0.0448  -  -  0.0302  0.2501 
  (0.0085)  (0.1281)  -  -  (0.0206)  (0.2274) 
SZ  -0.0115  0.2950  -0.1274***  -0.7760*  -0.0565  -0.6194 
  (0.0177)  (0.2788)  (0.0444)  (0.4455)  (0.0418)  (0.5088) 
AR(1)  0.7398***  0.3823***      0.9120***  0.7817*** 
  (0.0408)  (0.1424)      (0.1844)  (0.0994) 
AR(2)          -0.1023  -0.0238 
          (0.1623)  (0.0803) 
Adjusted R
2  0.8946  0.6576  0.8396  0.6465  0.8966  0.6861 
SE  (0.0062)  (0.0747)  0.0078  0.0833  0.0068  0.0663 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels respectively. SE is standard error.  
Across PLS, GMM and FEM, with all variables, capital has a positive relationship with ROA 
(significant in two of the regressions), and negative but not relationship with ROE (table 2); 
the results are similar when DG and LG are excluded (table 3).  That is, when assets are used 
as the basis of profitability, the association is positive, when the basis is capital itself, the sign 
turns negative.  Where capital itself is the base, expectedly, an increase in the base is likely to 
result in lower returns.  Heffernan and Fu (2010) also find both positive and negative 
relationships of capital with profitability measures.   
Results are quite consistent in the case of Deposit (DEP) with both ROA and ROE across 
different methods; the relationship is mostly positive, with or without DG and LG (tables 2 
and 3).  It is statistically significant in two regressions; both in the same direction, positive.  
The results indicate that institutions with higher levels of assets financed by deposit liabilities 13 
 
are likely to be more profitable.  The cost of mobilising and holding deposit liabilities in Fiji 
is expected to be relatively low for reasons including limited investment options for savers; 
indeed interests paid on deposits have been relatively low across the South Pacific and the 
user pay system reduces frequency of demand deposit transactions and thereby, associated 
maintenance costs.   
Interestingly, however, deposit growth (DG) has a negative relationship with both ROA and 
ROE; the relationship is not only consistent across different methods but also statistically 
significant in four of the six regressions (table 3).  The results appear to indicate that while 
deposit financing may be an important determinant of profitability, some institutions may 
have reached their optimum deposit–asset ratios and those seeking to expand their deposit 
base assertively, with the intention of eventually improving profitability, may have to do so at 
the cost of rising expenses and falling profitability in the meantime.  Moreover, institutions 
may not be able to convert high growth in deposits into high income generating assets; due 
perhaps to lack of bankable projects (ADB, 2005).  Our findings are similar to that of 
Dietrich and Wanzenried, (2011).   
While  high  deposit to asset ratios may contribute positively to profitability of deposit 
institutions,  high  loan  to asset ratios appear to have the opposite  effect, i.e. reduce 
profitability.  Across all three methods, using all variables, the association of LON with both 
ROA and ROE is consistently negative; it is also statistically significant in two of the six 
regressions (table 2).  The results are very similar when DG and LG are excluded; in five of 
the six regressions the sign is negative and again statistically significant in two regressions 
(table  3).  Moreover,  loan growth  (LG) also appears to be negatively associated with 
profitability; in four of the six regressions, the sign is negative, including in the instance that 
it is statistically significant (table 2).  Thus, both high levels of loans relative to assets and 
high growth in loans appear to be unprofitable for deposit institutions in Fiji.   
When all variables are included, credit risk (CR) is negatively associated with both ROA and 
ROE in the PLS and FEM regressions and positively in the GMM; the result is statistically 
significant in only one regression, GMM and ROA.  Moreover, the results are similar when 
DG and LG are excluded; the result is again statistically significant in only one regression, 
GMM  and ROA.  Further, when it is statistically significant, the sign is consistent and 14 
 
positive, indicating that higher levels of provisioning may actually improve profitability.   
Perhaps, regulatory provisioning requirements have made the institutions relatively 
conservative, i.e. institutions may be setting provisions at much higher rates relative to actual 
loss experiences.  Perhaps, the cautious stance is driven also by the on–going high levels of 
uncertainties in the global financial markets.  Heffernan and Fu (2010) also find both positive 
and negative relationships of credit risk with different profitability measures.   
The association of liquid assets (LQA) with both ROA and ROE is consistently negative 
across all six regressions, using all variables.  When DG and LG are excluded, the association 
is negative in five of the six regressions.  Moreover, including or excluding DG and LG, the 
results are statistically significant in four regressions: PLS and ROA, and FEM and ROA.  
Thus, as expected, it appears that high levels of liquid assets are indeed unprofitable for 
deposit institutions in Fiji.  Our findings are similar to that of Bourke (1989) and Molyneux 
and Thorton (1992).  However, contrary to expectations, non–interest income (NII) does not 
appear to positively influence profitability of deposit institutions in Fiji.  When all variables 
are included, the relationship is negative (but not significant) in four of the six regressions.  
When DG and LG are excluded, the relationship is still negative in four of the six regressions 
but now statistically significant.   
Funding cost  (FC) has a positive relationship in eleven of the twelve regressions  and 
statistically significant in two regressions,  suggesting that increased costs of mobilising 
deposits are likely to be passed on to clients, via perhaps increased interest and/or non–
interest charges, with the charges being proportionately higher than the cost of funding itself.  
This notion appears to be confirmed by the unambiguous positive relationship between 
Operational efficiency  (OE)  and profitability.  Interestingly,  the relationship is also 
statistically highly significant across all twelve regressions, suggesting that deposit 
institutions in Fiji are able to pass on their operational costs to customers via higher spreads 
to keep profits unaffected.  Flamini et al (2009) studying the case of Sub–Saharan Africa, 
where profits are known to be  relatively high, also find a positive relationship between 
operational efficiency and profitability.   
The above finding also suggests that market power in the case of Fiji would be a key 
determinant of profitability; indeed, the relationship between the  Lerner Index (LI)  and 15 
 
profitability is also unambiguously positive and statistically highly significant across all 12 
regressions.  Our findings are similar to those of Bourke (1989), Molyneux and Thornton 
(1992) and Dietrich and Wanzenried, (2011), confirming the structure–conduct–performance 
hypothesis that market power yields high profits for deposit institutions in the case of Fiji.  
Results also show that non–bank deposit institutions may be more profitable compared to 
bank deposit institutions; the relationship between institutions type (INSD) and profitability is 
mostly positive and occasionally significant. 
Conclusion and policy implications 
This study investigates the profitability determinants of deposit–taking institutions in Fiji, a 
representative South Pacific island economy.  Across the region, financial systems are small 
and relatively underdeveloped with capital markets either non–existent or extremely small, 
including in Fiji.  Moreover, the economies are constantly growth–challenged and remain 
underdeveloped, fragile, burdened with high levels of poverty, unemployment, and 
experience other socio–economic problems.   
 
Yet, banks across the South Pacific remain highly profitable; returns on assets commonly 
exceed international averages
7.  The results of this study suggest that market power may be a 
key determinant of high profitability of deposit–taking institutions  in Fiji, and possibly 
elsewhere in the region.  The relationship between market power (measured by the Lerner 
Index) is not only positive but also statistically highly significant across all twelve 
regressions, using three different techniques—Panel Least Squares (PLS) with AR (1) errors, 
Fixed Effects Model (FEM) and Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) with AR (1) and 
AR (2) errors—and two profitability measures—return on assets (ROA) and return on equity 
(ROE).   
 
                                                           
7 http://www.pftac.org/Handbooks/Governors%20Paper.pdf 16 
 
It is perhaps due to a considerable level of market power that deposit–taking institutions in 
Fiji are able to pass on the interest cost of deposit liabilities and overall operational costs to 
their clients.  Funding cost, defined as the ratio of interest expenses relative to total deposits 
and operational efficiency, defined as the operating cost to gross income are positively and 
highly correlated with both ROA and ROE, across the three different estimation techniques 
utilised in this study.  Results also suggest that expanding the deposit and/or the loan base 
beyond a certain level may not be in the best interest of institutions in Fiji; higher levels of 
capital funding of assets may actually be more profitable.   
With the usual caveats in mind, the findings of this study do have important implications for 
policymakers.  On the one hand, the South Pacific economies continue to struggle with 
growth, poverty and inequality; on the other hand, deposit–taking institutions—the main and 
sometimes the only source of investment and financing activities in the region—continue to 
earn very high profits, unabated even by external shocks such as the 2007 GFC.  While 
profitability strengthens institution and systemic stability, very high profits have the potential 
to reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of the process of financial intermediation, including 
exacerbating instances of financial exclusion, if high profits imply high cost of borrowing 
and/or low rates on savings.  The implications are likely to more severe where financial 
markets are small and underdeveloped and firms and individuals rely heavily on financial 
institutions for funding, such as in Fiji and elsewhere in the South Pacific. 
Thus, policymakers may like to consider developing policies and strategies that may lead to a 
more competitive financial system.  Unabated, it is likely that deposit–taking institutions 
might opt for more capital financing of assets rather than deposit; similarly, high growth in 
loans is unlikely if profits can be generated otherwise.  Both situations would be highly 
unfavourable  for the already growth–  and poverty–challenged, economies in the South 
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